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 i.  introduction: the realities of pluralism 
 The starting point of this chapter is somewhat different from that of most contribu-
tors to this volume, in part because of my late-comer status to the project, as well 
as my outsider perspective. Some European legal systems, but also Canada and the 
United States, have over time developed highly regulated state-centric methods of 
family law management that seemed to leave little or no room for religious and 
other authorities to make any input. Today’s agonized debates over the emergence of 
some eighty-i ve Sharia Councils and Muslim Arbitration Tribunals in Britain thus 
rel ect surprise, to put it mildly, that supposedly strong states are in fact not fully in 
control of family law regulation. 
 Such debates (if one can call them that) show that it is not sufi ciently well 
known in a global context that European and North American models of regulatory 
framework are not universally replicated all over the globe. Colonialism never fully 
achieved its ambitious civilizing missions. In particular, it did not wipe out most 
preexisting sociocultural (and thus legal) traditions, but it did inl uence them. Today 
there is certainly no single, global method of managing family relations through state 
intervention. Rather, there are many ways of handling family law. Individual states 
have gradually developed patterns that suit their country-specii c needs and national 
identities. In many cases, however, colonial intervention and other interferences 
imposed certain patterns that are not even close to what one may call “ indigenous.” 
Hybridity of legal regulation is thus a global fact everywhere; pluralism of methods, 
specii cally in the management of family relations, is a global reality. 
 For many scholars, this raises the question (in my view quite misguided) of 
whether it is possible to conceive of and develop an ideal model suitable for all. 
In this respect, it seems that the grass is always greener on the other side of the 
fence. Hence many countries with state-centric regulation mechanisms, including 
the United States and Canada, are now debating whether there should be less state 
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control or a more sophisticated method of state-driven intervention such as a revised 
multi-tiered system of legal regulation. 1 At the same time, many legal systems that 
have retained less state control have been engaged in equally tortuous discussions 
over increasing state involvement. 
 In the world as a whole, I see today three types of legal systems 2 : (1) those that 
claim to have state-centric regulation through all-encompassing general laws 
for all citizens or residents, with France being a somewhat extreme example; (2) 
countries like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and many oth-
ers that maintain a fairly centralized system but allow a unique legal position for 
one particular group of people, often the original inhabitants of the land; and (3) 
countries and legal systems that incorporate an explicitly pluralistic combination 
of “general law” and various country-specii c “personal laws” for different groups 
of people, not necessarily on the basis of religion. The third category is much 
larger than Eurocentric scholars seem to be aware. It certainly includes countries 
like South Africa 3 and actually comprises most countries of Asia and Africa. For 
example, the Indian legal system has had to manage religious and legal pluralism 
for thousands of years. It has coped with the presence of Muslim personal law for 
centuries and today covers more than 150 million Muslims within an ofi cially 
secular legal framework. 4 
 Various personal law methods of legal regulation apply to the majority of the 
world’s population today and are not historical remnants from Roman or Ottoman 
times. These powerful legal realities deserve respect for their capacity to operate 
intricate regulatory frameworks for billions of people. Assuming that one’s own 
system, or any one particular system for that matter, is somehow the norm is a fatal 
methodological error. We must acknowledge that no legal system in the world has 
managed to maintain perfect justice at all times before we pass judgment on distant 
“others.” 
 On the one hand, it is evident from this volume that state-centric types of legal 
systems in the i rst and second categories currently face debates about pluralization; 
 1  On governability, see Katherine Osterlund, “Love, Freedom and Governance: Same-Sex Marriage in 
Canada,”  Social & Legal Studies 18:1 (March 2009): 93–109. See also Joel A. Nichols, “Multi-Tiered 
Marriage: Ideas and Inl uences from New York and Louisiana to the International Community,” 
 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 40 (January 2007): 135–196; and Joel A. Nichols, “Multi-
Tiered Marriage: Reconsidering the Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion” (in this volume). 
 2  Werner Menski, “Law, Religion and South Asians in Diaspora,” in  Religious Reconstruction in the 
South Asian Diasporas: From One Generation to Another , ed. John R. Hinnells (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 243–264, 252–257. 
 3  See Johan D. van der Vyver, “Multi-Tiered Marriages in South Africa” (in this volume). 
 4  In India, “secular” means equidistance of the state from all religions, which is not quite the same 
as the U.S. system, although there are remarkable overlaps. See Gerald James Larson, ed.,  Religion 
and Personal Law in Secular India: A Call to Judgment (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2001). 
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relaxation of state control; less rigid formality regarding marriage, aspects of divorce, 
and related matters; and post-divorce maintenance law. 5 They face pressure to adopt 
pluralization and more explicit recognition of various interactive boundary crossings 
between state regulation and other normative orderings. On the other hand, states 
in the third category have found themselves under various pressures to modern-
ize, impose uniform rules, and effect more centralized state control, specii cally to 
reform and control “religious” personal law systems. Often explicitly portrayed as an 
urgent matter of justice, these pressures aim for what in India is called a “Uniform 
Civil Code.” Found in Article 44 of the Indian Constitution of 1950 and framed as 
a program for the future, it envisages a new civil law structure that would apply to 
all people. 6 
 Although pulling the state out of marriage and family law altogether is rightly 
considered risky and is probably not really sustainable, de facto pluralization, par-
ticularly as a result of new sociocultural developments and recent migrations from 
other parts of the world, 7 has become a part of social reality in the Western world. 8 
Such developments – nothing new in countries outside the Western hemisphere – 
have given rise to whole new sets of literature that largely agonize over fears of state-
centric mechanisms losing control to religious authorities and other forces right in 
our midst. This loss of control is perceived as undermining various forms of human 
rights protections and is portrayed as particularly negative for women and children. 9 
Somehow, it is never questioned in depth whether state regulation does not also 
pose risks of certain kinds of violence and infringements of basic rights. In South 
 5  See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, “Pluralism and Decentralization in Marriage Regulation” (in this volume); 
Daniel Cere, “Canadian Conjugal Mosaic: From Multiculturalism to Multi-Conjugalism?” (in this 
volume); Ann Laquer Estin, “Unofi cial Family Law” (in this volume); Nichols, “Reconsidering the 
Boundaries” (in this volume). 
 6  As shown in this chapter, this anticipated development did not materialize. An astute early critic of 
excessive positivism quite rightly called this “no more than a distant mirage.” Antony Allott,  The Limits 
of Law (London: Butterworth, 1980), 216. 
 7  Rather than treating this as a form of legal transplant, I speak about reverse colonization and call 
this private importation of ethnic minority legal concepts “ethnic implants.” See Werner Menski, 
 Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2d ed. 2006), 58–65. 
 8  For Britain, much before the Archbishop of Canterbury made his comments and caused a storm, I 
devised the concept of British Muslim law ( angrezi shariat ) as a hybrid entity to indicate that state con-
trol over family law can never be absolute. Various communities and individuals in their daily lives, 
rather than states, face the challenges of navigating the boundaries of ofi cial and unofi cial laws. For 
details, see David Pearl and Werner Menski,  Muslim Family Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 3d ed. 
1998). On the U.S. scenario, see Saminaz Zaman, “ Amrikan Shari’a : The Reconstruction of Islamic 
Family Law in the United States,”  South Asia Research 28:2 (July 2008): 185–202. 
 9  See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, “Marriage Pluralism in the United States: On Civil and Religious 
Jurisdiction and the Demands of Equal Citizenship” (in this volume) and Robin Fretwell Wilson, 
“The Perils of Privatized Marriage” (in this volume). 
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Asia, at any rate, states are well known as the worst violators of the law. Moreover, 
secular civil law regulation is certainly not value-neutral, but scholars often seem 
to “know” what is good and bad, prejudging the entire i eld through preconceived 
notions. Scholars thereby exhibit various forms of amnesia and myopia, specii cally 
when it comes to assessing developments in non-European legal contexts. As some-
one with one foot in the East and one in the West, I i nd myself having to write one 
article after the other about such issues. 10 
 The present volume seeks to take the debate about management of family law 
further than the existing literature. The main question appears to be whether del-
egating authority to religious authorities would be a feasible method of meeting 
the challenges of increased sociocultural pluralization and of new forms of family 
arrangement. New patterns often go well beyond the standard norm of marriage as 
a lifelong bond between one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others; 
they comprise both the retraditionalizing effects of global non-Western migration 
in all directions and also the recent manifestations of modern Western sociocultural 
changes. I i nd the focus of analysis a little too narrowly put on the competition of 
state law and religion, when in fact the i eld is much more complex and plural than 
mere binary pairings of these elements – of East and West, or North and South, or of 
tradition and modernity. Reality almost everywhere is increasingly marked by super-
diversity. 11 Whereas the focus in this volume is largely on U.S. law and whether a 
multi-tiered marriage system would be a suitable form of legal regulation, my contri-
bution to this debate aims to show that a sophisticated pluralistic regulatory system 
has already existed in India for thousands of years, only more recently supplemented 
by stronger and more explicitly targeted state control. This indicates that abandon-
ing the state altogether does not seem feasible, but ignoring the other inputs and 
players is not a feasible solution either. So perhaps we must be active, conscious 
pluralists, whether we like it or not. 
 Starting from ancient pluralistic roots of legal self-regulation, Indian law offers a 
model that has always respected various competing religious and cultural normative 
patterns while gradually developing increasingly i ne-tuned overall state control, 
albeit with notable limits to positivist intervention. This Indian method of managing 
“good governance” has turned into a specii c form of a social welfare state. However, 
in this system of partial regulation, the state is neither willing nor able to devote suf-
i cient resources to rescue disadvantaged citizens; it mainly aims to create support-
ive conditions for self-controlled ordering of human actions. This is also true when 
 10  See, e.g., Werner Menski, “Beyond Europe,” in  Comparative Law: A Handbook , eds. David Nelken 
and Esin Őrűcű (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 189–216. 
 11  On Britain still overlooking the legal dimensions of such super-diversity, see Steven Vertovec, “Super-
Diversity and its Implications,”  Ethnic and Racial Studies 30:6 (November 2007): 1024–1054. 
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it comes to social welfare arrangements. 12 With many more than a billion citizens 
today, the l ip side of state respect for religious and social self-control in India is now 
increasingly manifesting itself as explicit reliance on family and communal support 
mechanisms, especially among women, children, and the elderly. 13 As a result, the 
state calls on men and other persons who have control over resources to operational-
ize enhanced obligations rather than enjoy superior rights. This responsibility arises 
from the basic foundations of traditional value systems in Indic cultures, which are 
built on presumptions of interconnectedness and duties toward others rather than 
on individual rights. 
 Managing this particular method of family law regulation has never been easy or 
uncontroversial. The Indian state today largely continues to sit back and let people 
decide the details of how to lead their lives. The state offers merely a symbolic safety 
net through somewhat symbolic fundamental rights guarantees, and little more. 
However, these minimal guarantees undergird Indian state interventions if there are 
unsustainable or blatantly unjust or imbalanced developments within various soci-
eties and religious normative orders. For example, the dei nition of “wife” in Indian 
law has since 1973 included “divorced wife.” 14 It took decades for this deliberate 
manipulation of social relations to occur, yet this subtle move has proven powerful 
in the long run. These seemingly symbolic state interventions probably now also 
inl uence private interactions between individuals in their homes. (Laborious i eld-
work would be necessary to ascertain that.) Formal interventions may take the form 
of such symbolic legislation or signii cant judicial pronouncements, rel ecting the 
fact that India is not just a traditional common law system but an extremely hybrid 
jurisdiction. This intricate interplay of various judicial and legislative elements cre-
ates powerful legal dynamisms with remarkable outcomes. 
 It should surprise no one that the traditional Indian method of relying on self-
controlled ordering in society was never fully effective on its own. However, it is a 
mistake to dismiss it as too problematic rather than seeing its intrinsic ameliorative 
potential. Before jumping to conclusions about certain perceived crises of the state 
or signii cant alleged maldevelopments, 15 one i rst needs to understand what has 
 12  Recent evidence of bureaucratic abuses of India’s meager welfare program strengthens doubts over 
the feasibility of state-centric welfare mechanisms. See Subhash Mishra, “Ghosts in the Darkness,” 
 India Today , August 20, 2009, available at  http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/57748/States/
Ghosts +in+the+darkness.html (detailing how women connive with ofi cials under a new Widow 
Pension Scheme to declare their husbands dead). 
 13  See Werner F. Menski,  Modern Indian Family Law (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 2001). 
 14  India Code of Criminal Procedure § 125 (1973). 
 15  Attractive-looking books such as Rajeshwari Sunder Rajan,  The Scandal of the State: Women, Law and 
Citizenship in Postcolonial India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003) are political manifestos 
rather than factually reliable legal analyses. Such writing must be treated with caution, because even 
basic legal facts are misrepresented. 
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actually been going on in Indian law “on the ground” and how such intricate plu-
ralistic regulatory methods, grounded in thousands of years of experience handling 
legal conl icts, pan out today. 16 
 Remarkably, this complex story is hardly ever told because too few legal scholars 
are also trained as Indologists, historians, or social scientists. Indian textbook writers 
are mostly sterile “black letter” lawyers who typically list one judgment after another 
and fail to analyze what they report. Most damaging, much writing on Indian law 
these days comes from scholars, often Indian scholars based abroad, who are highly 
politicized commentators and self-appointed social reformers. Ideological blinders 
and often personal agendas prevent them from giving global readership a compre-
hensive account of Indian legal developments. As a result, selective and highly par-
tisan reporting on Indian family law (and many other non-Western legal systems in 
the world, especially neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh) has not allowed us to 
gain a full picture of the various methods of legal management that exist in the inter-
play between so-called religious laws and civil laws in various jurisdictions around 
the globe and specii cally in South Asia. 
 In this chapter, I seek to show that India’s long-tested method of handling family 
law intricately combines overall state control with ongoing deep respect for – and 
explicit recognition of – social and religious authorities. In such explicitly pluralist 
scenarios, no one form of authority is ever beyond criticism. No entity is allowed to 
control the entire i eld autonomously. Legal monism is restrained and every com-
ponent, as Sally Falk Moore suggested decades ago, is “semi-autonomous.” 17 Hence, 
all players in South Asian legal scenarios have had to be somewhat altruistic in their 
interactions with other legal actors to maintain stability and continuity. Legal plu-
ralism has long been a fact in South Asia, and such complex management is not 
easy to achieve; it may become unbalanced or uprooted, as can be seen from the 
unfortunate developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to a lesser extent in 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. India appears to have reached reasonably stable demo-
cratic standards in pursuing sustainable methods of family law regulation. Recent 
 A prominent example is the persistent global  misrepresentation of the  Shah Bano saga in Indian 
law. The story of how an old Muslim lady was thrown out of marriage, deprived of her legal entitle-
ments by an unscrupulous lawyer-husband, and then let down by a gender-insensitive legal system is 
brilliant scholarly i ction. This i ction has been used to support familiar allegations that “religious law” 
is bad for women and that modern secular state intervention in India has been totally ineffective. The 
real story will be discussed further in its wider context later in this chapter. 
 16  For a sample of excellent i eldwork-based study, see Sylvia Vatuk, “Divorce at the Wife’s Initiative in 
Muslim Personal Law: What are the Options and What are Their Implications for Women’s Welfare?” 
in  Redei ning Family Law in India , eds. Archana Parashar and Amita Dhanda (London: Routledge, 
2008), 200–235. 
 17  Sally Falk Moore,  Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1978). 
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historical scholarship suggests, however, that this may have been achieved at a cost: 
allowing the Pakistanis to have their own neighboring state only to i nd that Muslim 
law remains a critical component in India’s legal scenario. 
 My coverage of recent Indian developments in marriage law and post-divorce 
maintenance arrangements is prefaced by a brief historical overview to inform read-
ers on the remarkable cultural and conceptual continuities in South Asian legal 
systems. These continuities are embedded with ancient concepts of self-controlled 
ordering and accountability for one’s own actions, ideas originally developed outside 
state-centric legal regulation in various Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, and Muslim religio-
cultural contexts. These multicultural building blocks are now subtly incorporated 
into – and ultimately supervised by – ofi cially “secular” and religiously equidistant 
formal legal structures. A clear rel ection of such “soft” duty-based approaches is 
embodied in the new Article 51A of the Indian Constitution, which comprises a set 
of Fundamental Duties. These include the duty “to promote harmony and the spirit 
of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, lin-
guistic and regional or sectional diversities; to renounce practices derogatory to the 
dignity of women”; 18 and “to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite 
culture.” 19 
 Although modern Indian law thus looks at i rst sight like a Western legal sys-
tem and even seems to resemble U.S. law, 20 the trajectory of Indian legal develop-
ments and outcomes is in fact very different from what we i nd in Europe or North 
America. Lessons from the Indian experience are therefore not directly transposable 
to our contexts. However, by showing how the Indian law of marriage and post-
divorce maintenance has developed in recent times, I seek to illustrate that an intri-
cate pluralist combination of state control and socioreligious management can and 
does work. This model offers sustainable solutions, even though it remains subject 
to never-ending manipulations and i ne-tuning. Law, after all, is a culture-specii c, 
dynamic process and not merely a set of rules. 
 ii.  ancient roots of pluralism and boundary crossing 
 India’s so-called composite culture has manifestly ancient roots. 21 Diversity man-
agement has been an integral element of South Asian social and legal systems for 
centuries. Examples include the much-maligned and heavily abused caste system, 
 18  Constitution of India , Article 51A(e) (1950). 
 19  Ibid., Article 51A(f). 
 20  Larson,  Religion and Personal Law in Secular India . 
 21  It seems the word “multiculturalism” – which perhaps suggests polluting mélanges – has become 
disfavored. 
Werner Menski226
which evinces the basic recognition that humans have different functions in life, 
and also the enormously important ancient ethnic encounters that specialist schol-
ars are still struggling to unravel. 22 Very few lawyers, Western or Indian, are able to 
perceive these basically cultural Indic roots as potent and intrinsically plural growth 
stimulants for an amazingly versatile system of gradually developing legal regula-
tion. 23 “Hinduism” may well be a more recent term and a constructed entity, but 
Indic culture itself has unquestionably ancient pedigree and is manifestly more than 
a religious tradition. 24 
 Indic cultural traditions include ancient textual evidence, dating to circa 1000 
 bce , that explicitly and intimately connects human marriage rituals to macrocos-
mic phenomena. 25 These texts laid conceptual foundations that have receded into 
the past and tend to be forgotten and ignored today. They are deliberately omit-
ted by many scholars today because of their allegedly suspect religious provenance. 
However, such deep-rooted concepts within the subconscious of Indic people of 
all kinds, including now many South Asian Muslims and Christians, continue to 
exert much invisible and indeed some visible inl uence. Many legal systems in 
Asia have been inl uenced by the migration of such early Indic concepts, especially 
throughout Southeast Asia and into the Far East, extending from Japan west past 
Afghanistan and Iran. 26 Excavating these ancient pluralisms helps to explain why 
India is so different from other jurisdictions today regarding management of family 
law regulations. 
 Given such ancient Indic foundational concepts, it is not surprising that modern 
Indian family law struggles with implementing state control of marriage. Marriage 
was, i rst of all, a new relationship of a man and a woman, linked to family, clan, 
and community and ritually connected through the solemnization of increasingly 
elaborate rituals directed toward the Universe. It was not primarily a matter for the 
state. 27 Interconnectedness was the key element of early Indic thought, conceptually 
embedded in dynamic terms like  karma (action and its consequences) and  dharma 
(the duty of everyone to do the right thing at any moment of one’s life). This concept 
 22  A key issue here is whether Indic cultures were signii cantly inl uenced by early European or Central 
Asian models (“the Aryan question”) as a result of migrations. A related issue is the relative input of 
non-Aryan cultures, specii cally Dravidian and various tribal models. The latter would bring Indians 
closer to Africans, which is widely resented. 
 23  For details, see Werner F. Menski,  Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
 24  Werner Menski, “Hindu Law as a ‘Religious’ System,” in  Religion, Law and Tradition: Comparative 
Studies in Religious Law , ed. Andrew Huxley (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 108–126. 
 25  Menski,  Hindu Law , 86–93. 
 26  Ibid. 
 27  See Stephen B. Presser, “Marriage and the Law: Time for a Divorce?” (in this volume) (concerning 
the nature of marriage and its connection to the state in the Western common law tradition). 
Ancient and Modern Boundary Crossings 227
was manifested in the expectation that microcosmic entities and processes should 
perennially be harmonized with visions of macrocosmic Order. 28 
 The failed imperial and colonial efforts – by Muslims and especially by the 
British – to restructure Indian personal laws and to privilege state control are sim-
plistically characterized by many post-colonial scholars as mischievous actions that 
afforded unwarranted prominence to religion. As a result, even the most recent stud-
ies on Indian family law are content to presume that Indian personal laws are just 
religious constructs. This intellectually impoverished approach completely ignores 
the intense interaction and constant border crossing between various forms of law 
within Hindu and Indian law and precludes even analyzing interactions between 
secular “general laws” and allegedly religious “personal laws.” 29 
 Ignorance of Indic cultural traditions and unwillingness to accept and interrogate 
the complex subsequent developments within India’s deeply plurality-conscious 
family law are also rel ected when surprised legal observers note and/or are forced to 
admit that in India today a Hindu (or indeed Muslim) marriage still becomes legally 
valid not through an act of state-ordained registration but through performance of 
requisite religious and social ceremonies. It is worth emphasizing that both religious 
 and social aspects exist, underscoring the fact that manifestations of legal pluralism 
are not restricted to struggles between law and religion; they comprise every aspect 
of human existence. Marriage registration documents are not unknown, but they 
are normally not the appropriate i nal proof that a legally valid marriage exists, espe-
cially because documents can be purchased and forged. 30 Scholars, including many 
South Asian lawyers, became brainwashed by legal positivism and focus solely on 
“the law” and therefore struggle to understand what is really going on in the com-
plex i eld of South Asian laws. 
 Moreover, many scholars, as this volume coni rms, have deep-seated ideologi-
cal problems with legal pluralism and thus tend to advise that state-centric con-
trol mechanisms promote good governance and rule of law better than allegedly 
limitless pluralism. 31 This shows that we still live in the age of positivism, which 
 28  Ibid., 71–130; Menski,  Comparative Law in a Global Context , 196–234. 
 29  See Parashar and Dhanda,  Redei ning Family Law in India . Notably, the very i rst sentence of the edi-
tors’ introduction decrees conceptual blindness and tolerates no dissent: “Family law is synonymous 
with religious personal laws in India.” Ibid., ix. 
 30  This was illustrated in the Workshop on Informal Marriages and Dutch Law, held in Amsterdam on 
March 13, 2003, under the guidance of Dr. Leila Jordens-Cotran. Although the proceedings from that 
Workshop are unpublished, unfortunately, they include papers explaining why Dutch immigration 
ofi cials had wrongly assumed for some time, simply on the basis of marriage documents, that many 
marriages between foreign Muslim men and Dutch women were legally valid. 
 31  See, e.g., McClain, “Marriage Pluralism in the United States” (in this volume); Katherine Shaw 
Spaht, “Covenant Marriage Laws: A Model for Compromise” (in this volume); Wilson, “The Perils of 
Privatized Marriage” (in this volume). 
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proudly claims to have developed out of earlier stages of legal theorizing that were 
focused on more or less religio-centric natural law. Such misguided evolutionary 
thinking among lawyers and other observers is simply not maintainable in the long 
run. Revision is rel ected in the currently growing attention at last given to legal plu-
ralism as an ever-present phenomenon, 32 expressed in various ways as the ubiquitous 
nature of law 33 (which is a simple word with many meanings). 
 This trend toward more open-minded acceptance of the law as internally plural, 
and thus always as its own other, was rel ected in my earlier studies of legal pluralism 
as a global phenomenon. 34 My analysis has recently further considered the current 
expectation that international human rights norms are new forms of natural law that 
need to be built into global pictures of law. The result of such plurality-conscious 
theorizing has been the emergence of new, complex models of envisaging law and 
pluralism. 35 The messy realities of legal pluralism do not comport neatly with popu-
lar obsessions with legal certainty and will therefore irritate “black letter lawyers.” 
 Whereas strong Indian legal pluralism, in the sense that John Grifi ths uses the 
term, 36 is partly a postmodern phenomenon, recent research has uncovered impor-
tant lessons about the ubiquity of legal pluralism in time and space. It appears that 
Indic laws always operated beyond the boundaries of tradition and modernity. For 
example, evidence of acute consciousness of patterns of legal pluralism existed 
already in Vedic times (circa 1500 to 1000  bce ). This consciousness was character-
ized by heavily contested and competing truth claims in relation to law (in the wider 
sense of cosmic Truth – that is, natural law rather than state law) along patterns quite 
akin to today’s struggles over the “war on terror.” 37 State law was certainly not absent, 
but it also was clearly not dominant. Emerging concepts of the state (particularly of 
rulers as sponsors of certain elaborate ritual performances) remained subservient to 
higher forms of order, particularly macrocosmic Order. But in this heavily contested 
 32  Brian Z. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global,”  Sydney Law 
Review 30 (September 2008): 375–411. 
 33  Emmanuel Melissaris,  Ubiquitous Law. Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism (Farnham and 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009). 
 34  Menski,  Comparative Law in a Global Context , 82–192. 
 35  See Masaji Chiba, ed.,  Asian Indigenous Law in Interaction with Received Law (London and New 
York: KPI, 1986), excerpted in Menski,  Comparative Law in a Global Context , 119–128; Werner 
Menski, “Flying Kites:  Banglar Ghuri – Iccher Ghuri . Managing Family Laws and Gender Issues 
in Bangladesh,”  Stamford Journal of Law 2:1 (2009): 23; Werner Menski, “From the Amoeba to the 
Octopus. Socio-Legal Analysis of Plural Perspectives,” Osaka Symposium Paper, 2009 (to be pub-
lished in Japanese) (forthcoming). 
 36  See John Grifi ths, “What is Legal Pluralism?”  Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofi cial Law 24 
(1986): 1–56. 
 37  Werner Menski, “Sanskrit Law: Excavating Vedic Legal Pluralism,” paper for the 14th International 
Sanskrit Conference in Kyoto, September 2009 (to be published in the Conference Proceedings) 
(forthcoming). 
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i eld, “religion” was also clearly not the sole or unquestionably dominant force. 
There were many religions and competing philosophies and visions, including athe-
ism and agnosticism. Everything was contested among the people that lived at that 
time, just as we see today. 
 Because i ne conceptual distinctions of invisible religious truth and macrocos-
mic Order ( rita ) are recorded as coexisting with secular visible truth ( satya ) in such 
early textual sources, I can now i rmly deduce that struggles over law and religion 
are actually much older than previously imagined. However the later concept of 
 dharma developed – both as a central Hindu law term and as an idea of micro-
cosmic ordering – it is evident that Indian law today remains inl uenced by such 
early key concepts, 38 which we see in the Indian Constitution of 1950 and in many 
current laws. 
 The most recent legal developments in Indian family law, with which this chap-
ter is mainly concerned, are also invisibly but deeply inl uenced by ancient cultural 
notions that link religion, society, law, and everything else into a giant web of norma-
tive elements that humans have at their disposal to arrange their day-to-day affairs. 
That this inevitably introduces “religion” into “secular” patterns of law making and 
management is a lesson that Americans should i nd relatively easy to understand 
and accept. Many South Asian scholars and others who are deeply inl uenced by 
the post-Enlightenment ideal of strict separation of law and religion sometimes i nd 
it difi cult to grasp the basic meaning of “secularism” in Indian law and misun-
derstand it to be French-style separation of law and religion. This creates a huge 
obstacle for a plurality-conscious analysis of how today’s Indian family law handles 
competing claims among more than a billion citizens. 
 In such a complex i eld as family law, aiming for state-centric legal regulation 
would never lead to realistic and just outcomes and would run diametrically coun-
ter to ancient Indic principles of self-controlled ordering. These include, among 
others,  dharma – the expectation to do the right thing at the right time at any point 
of your life. 39 Some i fteen years ago, the self-appointed social reformer Madhu 
Kishwar rightly highlighted that modern Indian legislators, conscious of such pow-
erful ancient legal history and concepts, did not completely abolish “tradition” but 
rather presented ancient customs and normative patterns in a new, statutory form. 40 
Even the l avor of this old wine in new bottles irritates many modernity-focused 
 38  There are ongoing debates about whether the term  dharma has more Buddhist rather than Hindu 
antecedents. See Patrick Olivelle, “Hindu Law: The Formative Period, 400  b.c.e . – 400  c.e .,” in  The 
Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History , vol. 3, ed. Stanley N. Katz (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 151–155. 
 39  For details see Menski,  Hindu Law , 198–237. 
 40  See Madhu Kishwar, “Codii ed Hindu Law: Myth and Reality,”  Economic and Political Weekly 29:33 
(August 13, 1994): 2145–2161. 
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scholars who are still desperately arguing for the abolition of tradition and seeking to 
segregate law and culture. They constantly attempt to hide from public view what is 
actually going on in Indian family law in this impossible endeavor. Seeking to rede-
i ne the whole i eld on their own terms, they claim to search for justice, 41 but they 
fail to remember Derrida’s famous message of legal dynamism and innate plurality – 
namely, that justice is always  à venir . 42 In reality, such efforts are merely attempts 
to inject certain value judgments into ongoing global debates and to deliberately 
silence other voices. Such scholars disregard the voices of hundreds of millions of 
Indians who continue to live by what I call “slumdog law,” a law aware that its people 
live in atrocious conditions, are desperately poor, and face rights deprivation every 
second of their lives. 43 
 A legal system that knows most citizens struggle to feed themselves and their chil-
dren can nevertheless endeavor to promise people fundamental rights that may 
then be claimed in situations of dire emergency. For most Indian legal scenarios, 
however, informal regulations and self-controlled ordering are much more effec-
tive remedies than formal litigation, resulting in what has now become known as 
“law- related outcomes.” 44 These outcomes are not based on strict adherence to the 
letter of state law, which is often too contemptuous of the average citizen to be able 
to offer just and acceptable solutions. To analyze such multilayered phenomena, 
multiple lenses are required and even open-minded analysts must be prepared for 
surprises. If formal laws do not always mean what they seem to say, open-eyed obser-
vation is only a i rst step. 45 Many preconceived notions of what “law” is really about 
are challenged by evidence of strong and deep Indian forms of legal pluralism. 
 In such a hotly contested and ideologically poisoned i eld as family law, how does 
one analyze the signii cant boundary crossings and ongoing interactions between 
India’s personal law systems and the country’s general laws? This is the major chal-
lenge for the remainder of this chapter. The next section will i rst outline what the 
legal system appears to look like, and then following sections detail various examples 
of plurality-conscious interaction and purposeful boundary crossings. 
 41  Parashar and Dhanda,  Redei ning Family Law in India . 
 42  See Melissaris,  Ubiquitous Law , 20, 93. 
 43  Werner Menski, “Slumdog Law, Colonial Tummy Aches and the Redei nition of Family Law in 
India,”  South Asia Research 30:1 (February 2010): 67–80. 
 44  This term surfaced in conversation with Professor Mohan Gopal, former Director of the Bangalore 
National Law School of India and Head of the National Judicial Academy in Bhopal. 
 45  An important recent example is the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act of 2006, which makes child 
marriages in India voidable but not outright void. Additional reform proposals by the Indian Law 
Commission in 2008 seem to have been stalled by the realization that invalidating all child marriages 
would cause havoc among the very people the law seeks to protect. Such considerations did not arise 
from blind respect for any one religion, but owe to broader social concerns. The same goes for reform 
efforts to introduce compulsory registration of all Indian marriages. 
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 iii.  hindu family law within composite india 
 India inherited an extremely complex legal system characterized by a remarkable 
plurality of laws when the country gained independence in 1947. Even though 
Pakistan was carved out at the same time as a separate state for Muslims, India (as 
the major successor state of the colonial Empire) knew it would need to cater to 
an extremely diverse population, including many Muslims. In the short-term, this 
meant that the traditional personal law system would need to be retained. However, 
India employed a common tool of nation building – also a hallmark of modern 
legal reform in South Asian states – to tackle personal law reforms i rst, beginning 
with the respective majority personal law. Hindu law was thus subjected to vigorous 
reform efforts in India, whereas Pakistan was introducing legal reforms to Muslim 
family law. Both countries initially ignored the minority laws altogether. 
 The trend of modernizing and unifying Hindu family law was i rst promoted by 
the British during the nineteenth century, and it was then carried forward by some 
sections of the Indian elite. These elites were instrumental in securing further legis-
lative reforms, particularly the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act of 1937, which 
gave Hindu widows a “limited estate” in the share of the deceased husband to help 
ensure their dignii ed maintenance. Heated debates about various aspects of Hindu 
law reforms continued during the 1950s. 46 They were closely linked to tortuous ongo-
ing discussions about the position and future of India’s various personal laws. 47 The 
ofi cial Anglo-Hindu law at that time was mainly based on case law and precedent, 
whereas the major source of post-colonial Hindu law has been prominent legislative 
interventions. 48 Modern India clearly went much further than the colonial rulers in 
seeking to modernize and secularize Hindu law. 49 
 Immediately after independence, vigorous debates about the future of Hindu law 
in India resulted in the preparation of what is often misleadingly called the “Hindu 
Code.” This ambitious project of comprehensive codii cation, which also involved 
much proclaimed secularization and Westernization, was driven by a reform-focused 
 46  They are well documented in J. D. M. Derrett,  Hindu Law Past and Present (Calcutta: A. Mukherjee 
& Co., 1957). See also J. D. M. Derrett,  A Critique of Modern Hindu Law (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi, 
1970). 
 47  See Tahir Mahmood,  Personal Laws in Crisis (New Delhi: Metropolitan, 1986); Archana Parashar, 
 Women and Family Law Reform in India: Uniform Civil Code and Gender Equality (New Delhi: Sage, 
1992); Flavia Agnes,  Law and Gender Inequality: The Politics of Women’s Rights in India (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 48  For details, see Marc Galanter,  Law and Society in Modern India (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1989). 
 49  However, modernist reformers still did not attempt to abolish the traditional joint Hindu family alto-
gether. This happened, formally, only in the southern Indian state of Kerala through the Kerala Joint 
Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act of 1975. 
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London-trained barrister, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, who became a Buddhist to signal 
his disgust with Hindu caste discrimination. He was ultimately defeated, however, 
because his agendas were too radical. Instead, Indian lawmakers constructed an 
uneasy compromise between tradition and modernity: a typical pluralist assemblage 
in the form of four separate acts of Parliament regulating most aspects of modern 
Hindu family law. 50 
 At i rst blush, especially to outside observers, the result appears modern, reform-
focused, and uniform. However, this fragmented, state-made family law system often 
merely codii ed customary law. 51 On paper, polygamy was banned for Hindus, 52 but 
this reform has never been vigorously implemented. Polygamy among Hindus con-
tinues to exist and quite appropriately gives rise to rights for any affected women 
and children. 53 Numerous fault grounds for divorce were introduced in the Hindu 
Marriage Act. 54 However, the reformers not only retained the traditional law on 
Hindu marriage solemnization in Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act (discussed 
later in this chapter) but also allowed traditional Hindu customary patterns of 
divorce to continue. 55 This shows that India’s lawmakers in the 1950s still knew the 
old Hindu law fairly well and were acutely aware that it would continue to apply 
even after the formal statutory reforms. This underscores that effective law reform 
clearly does not – and cannot – happen overnight or at the stroke of a pen – a fact 
that Indian legislators know well. 
 Today, most Hindu divorces do not have to go through formal proceedings in state 
courts, contradicting the widespread presumption that earlier supposedly religious 
Hindu law did not accept or even know divorces. 56 In socio-legal reality, divorce 
was always possible. Yet because it was thought to be a serious deviation from the 
ideal of everlasting sacramental marriage, it was downplayed and hidden. Although 
reformist euphoria ruled the roost for some time during the 1960 and 1970s, 57 and in 
 50  These are the Hindu Marriage Act (1955), the Hindu Succession Act (1956), the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act (1956), and the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (1956). 
 51  Kishwar, “Codii ed Hindu Law.” 
 52  For details, see Menski,  Modern Indian Family Law , ch. 3; Menski,  Hindu Law , ch. 10. 
 53  This means that if husbands wish to engage in polygamous arrangements, they now have to pay for 
the privilege, as the extremely brief but powerful Supreme Court verdict in  Sumitra Devi v. Bhikhan 
Choudhary , AIR 1985 SC 765, establishes. 
 54  Specii cally in Section 13. For details, see Menski,  Modern Indian Family Law , ch. 2; Menski,  Hindu 
Law , ch. 11. 
 55  Hindu Marriage Act § 29(2). 
 56  Today, the picture “on the ground” remains extremely pluralistic, and Indian courts appear to give 
increasing recognition to customary divorces. Excellent i eldwork-based evidence on this, including 
reference to an instructive documentary i lm, is found in Livia Holden,  Hindu Divorce: A Legal 
Anthropology (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008). 
 57  J. D. M. Derrett,  The Death of a Marriage Law (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), makes reference to ear-
lier i eld studies about the impact of state-driven relaxations in divorce law for middle-class Hindu 
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1976 divorce by mutual consent was introduced, there have been no major statutory 
reforms to Hindu matrimonial law since then. 58 
 Post-colonial Indian lawmakers were unable to enact fully codii ed, state-centric 
Hindu law reforms. Postmodern Indian lawmakers, including many far-sighted 
judges and a silently active class of bureaucrats, seem to have covertly cultivated a 
new “slumdog law.” 59 Middle-class Indians detest such a term, but my students read-
ily adopt it as an analytical tool to cut through myopic middle-class rhetoric. Cheap, 
simple, and efi cient self-controlled ordering processes that utilize informal methods 
of settling disputes remain an important component of India’s family law regime. 
Strong evidence is found in several signii cant facts and developments analyzed in 
this chapter: (1) Indian marriage laws largely do not require formal state registration 
to establish the legal validity of a marriage, but they rely on evidence of customary 
solemnization rituals; (2) Indian divorces do not always have to go through formal 
court proceedings, and Indian divorced wives, in such a potentially perilous and 
hostile climate, came to benei t from special protective measures in the mid-1980s 
onward; and (3) the overall picture is not one of total state control through ofi cial 
laws, but rather a pluralistic scenario in which the constant navigation of boundaries 
between state law and non-state law is a central systemic factor. Because Indian mat-
rimonial law has been multi-tiered for a very long time, its analysis might indicate 
some signii cant perils and potential benei ts of plurality-conscious navigation for 
other jurisdictions. 
 iv.  the tortuous agenda of legal uniformity in indian law
 Before turning to substantive family law, it is important to examine the more gen-
eral issue of India’s continued refusal to develop Western-style state-centric legisla-
tion in the form of the projected Uniform Civil Code. As discussed previously, the 
four acts on Hindu family law are not a comprehensive code and do not purport 
to abolish or completely supersede the old Hindu law. Rather, they serve as a tool 
for further sociocultural, religious, and legal negotiations. Beyond Hindu law, the 
gradually restructured plurality of family law regulation for India has maintained 
much space for the concurrent system of traditional personal laws. This worked 
well even for some small minorities – including the Parsis, who lobbied successfully 
women, raising doubts about the usefulness of modern matrimonial reforms. See Rama Mehta, 
 Divorced Hindu Woman (Delhi: Vikas, 1975). 
 58  Indian judges, among others, have voiced the sentiment that legislative intervention has had deeply 
dangerous side effects, that divorce has become too easy, and that “we are not America.” 
 59  By “slumdog law” I mean to describe the actual ordering structures that are applied by and govern, 
apparently with ofi cial sanction, the numerous millions of people in India that live far below the 
 poverty line. 
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during the mid-1980s for modernizing reforms to retain their ethnic identity. 60 Just 
as Hindu law (the majority personal law system) was continuously subjected to 
reforms, we also i nd separate Muslim, Christian, Parsi, and Jewish laws. The much-
overlooked optional secular family law, critically important as an exit route from 
religious restrictions and as an alternative for foreigners, was also further reformed. 61 
Buddhists, Jainas, and Sikhs have also been governed by the modern codii ed Hindu 
law since the 1950s, ofi cially to reduce communal diversities. Because of the large 
space granted to customary traditions within the codii ed Hindu law, however, the 
inclusion of these communities has actually in practice increased the internal plu-
rality within modern Hindu law regulation. 
 Although it retained the personal law system and granted much space for non-
state law, India also put the agenda of state-centric national unii cation of laws 
into the Constitution. Article 44 of the Indian Constitution is an uncomfortable 
compromise between traditional self-controlled ordering within a personal law 
structure and reform-focused, state-centric legal regulation. The wording of Article 
44, namely that “[t]he state shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform 
civil code throughout the territory of India,” indicated a long-term program for 
development of the nation, through a Directive Principle of State Policy rather 
than a guaranteed and justiciable Fundamental Right. This article, however, has 
remained an empty declaration despite constant rhetoric from scholars and many 
judges about the supposed advantages of legal uniformity and the desirability of a 
Uniform Civil Code. 
 The diverse Hindu foundations of modern Indian law, as well as the massive 
demographic presence and considerable conceptual input of Muslim law, preclude 
an easy path for formal, uniform legal development in accordance with Western 
models. Modern Indian law thus remains and will remain a culture-specii c Asian 
legal system in its own right rather than an imperfect copy of some Western model. 
Legal plurality in Indian law will never disappear because it makes sense to retain it 
in a vast country that is conscious of its composite legal culture. From this perspec-
tive, too, pluralism is dei nitely an asset rather than a liability. Yet much agitated 
scholarly writing remains in favor of legal uniformity. 62 
 60  The result is the Parsi Marriage and Divorce (Amendment) Act of 1988, which contains provisions 
that are harmonized with the rules of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, as amended in 1976, and the 
similarly amended Special Marriage Act of 1954. 
 61  The main provisions of this are found in the Special Marriage Act (1954), which remains an optional 
secular law for most spouses. Under this act, a marriage becomes legally valid when the ofi cial reg-
istration documents are signed. Signii cantly, this act is not used by many couples, and its provisions 
and cumbersome procedures are now increasingly criticized as outdated. 
 62  See Narmada Khodie, ed.,  Readings in Uniform Civil Code (Bombay: Thacker, 1975); Vasudha 
Dhagamwar,  Towards the Uniform Civil Code (Bombay: Tripathi, 1989); Madhu Deolekar,  India 
Needs a Common Civil Code (Mumbai: Vivek Vyaspeeth, 1995); Kiran Deshta,  Uniform Civil Code: 
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 India’s concept of secularism also strengthens strategies to use law as a tool for 
creating a more cohesive composite nation. In modern Indian law, secularism does 
not have the same meaning as the Western concept of separation between law and 
religion or between church and state. 63 Rather, Indian law guarantees the state’s 
equidistance from all religions (and is somewhat akin to U.S. law in that respect) 64 
and clearly seeks to prevent India from ever declaring itself a majoritarian Hindu 
Republic. This notion of equidistance proved important when Indians, some years 
ago, elected a Hindu nationalist government of the Bharatiya Janata Party. More 
people then began to understand that calls for a Uniform Civil Code would actu-
ally mean advancement of Hinduization and vigorously maligned culture-specii c 
 hindutva tendencies. 
 The nuanced Indian concept of secularism arose from historical awareness of 
internal pluralities among and within religions and of their ancient coexistence in 
the sociopolitical and legal i elds. Hence, the new leaders of independent India 
(initially even of Pakistan) used this concept to promise religious minorities that 
they would not be treated as second-class citizens. In India, “secularism” posits 
equidistance – that is, the state’s equal respect for all religions – as a  Grundnorm 
of the Indian Constitution; it protects “others” against undemocratic majoritarian 
excesses and annihilation. Many are still haunted by the lived experience and 
memory of the massive ethnic cleansing conducted on the basis of religion that 
followed the achievement of independence in August of 1947. History demon-
strates that the multiethnic, multireligious nature of the Indian polity needs vig-
ilant protection because allegedly nonviolent Indic people can and often do use 
violent means of self-preservation. Even today, we hear of communal riots and 
virtual pogroms against certain groups of people in parts of India: the destruction 
of the Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya in 1993; the 2002 riots in Gujarat that left a 
disproportionate number of Muslims dead; and more recent killings of Christians 
in Orissa, to name a few. Managing a plural nation remains a major challenge. 
Simply blaming either pluralism or religion for such problems is not a sensible 
In Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1995); Dina Nath Raina,  Uniform Civil Code 
and Gender Justice (New Delhi: Reliance, 1996); Madhukar S. Ratnaparkhi,  Uniform Civil Code: 
An Ignored Constitutional Imperative (New Delhi: Atlantic, 1997); Virendra Kumar, “Uniform Civil 
Code Revisited: A Juridical Analysis of  John Vallamattom ,”  Journal of the Indian Law Institute 45:3–4 
(July–December 2003): 315–334. 
 63  See T. N. Madan, “Secularism in its Place,”  Journal of Asian Studies 46:4 (November 1987): 747–759; 
T. N. Madan, ed.,  Religion in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 1994); Robert D. Baird, 
ed.,  Religion and Law in Independent India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1993); Arun Shourie,  A Secular 
Agenda (New Delhi: ASA, 1993). 
 64  For U.S. law, see John Witte Jr. and Joel A. Nichols,  Religion and the American Constitutional 
Experiment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 3d ed. 2011); see also John Witte Jr. and Joel A. Nichols, 
“The Frontiers of Marital Pluralism: An Afterword” (in this volume). 
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academic approach, and secular fundamentalism is not a useful guiding principle 
in such culture-conscious surroundings. 
 While awaiting the implementation of a Uniform Civil Code, modernists pushed 
for the gradual creation of a more secularized, modernized Hindu law regarding 
families. Currently, there is pressure to bring about certain further reforms as evi-
dence of modern secularity, specii cally requiring compulsory registration of all mar-
riages and making divorces available on the basis of irretrievable breakdown. Such 
reformist approaches, initially pursued in a spirit of post-colonial euphoria, are today 
pressed with seemingly desperate and stubborn determination despite evidence that 
they would be bad for many “slumdog citizens.” Such culture-blind prescriptions 
ignore the enormous tension between uniformity and diversity, failing to appreciate 
that any new legal regulation would inl uence the nature of the interaction between 
ofi cial laws and unofi cial laws, between state law and the various forms of peo-
ple’s law. To understand this legal labyrinth from a plurality-conscious perspective, 
one must look well beyond ofi cial law reports and statutes. The lived differences 
between the converged personal laws are currently rather small, but politicized slo-
ganeering continues to exaggerate them by employing simplistic models and con-
cepts of law to gain adherents to an allegedly progressive cause. 
 This leads to a depressing picture, and it seems remarkable how easily scholars 
get away with such games. The most prominent examples cited are that Muslims 
in India may have up to four wives (and thus, of course, many children) and their 
men can pronounce instant  talaq . Few writers admit that far too many Hindu fam-
ilies continue also to have large numbers of offspring and that Hindu men are not 
exactly restrained from metaphorically throwing their wives to the wolves. Hindu 
polygamists openly benei t from the persistent nonimplementation of laws that 
would send Hindu polygamous males to jail for up to seven years. (And, of course, it 
seems unfair that Muslim polygamists would not face such penalties.) Indian courts 
have thus continued to administer the consequences of Hindu polygamy rather than 
enforce its abolition. 65 In reality, because Hindu men have found it much easier 
over the years to procure divorces, 66 and because South Asian Muslim women can – 
and increasingly do – abandon and divorce their husbands, 67 there are no signii cant 
legal differences between codii ed Hindu law and uncodii ed Muslim law. Even 
the extremely outdated Christian divorce law of India was quietly harmonized two 
weeks after 9/11 in the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act of 2001, which introduced 
ten different grounds for divorce virtually overnight. Scholars thus use purported 
 65  Menski,  Modern Indian Family Law , ch. 3. 
 66  Derrett,  The Death of a Marriage Law . 
 67  Vatuk, “Divorce at the Wife’s Initiative.” 
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legal contrasts between personal laws as political footballs without taking account of 
the application of the law itself. 
 The secular framework of the Indian Constitution, in its disavowal of religiously 
colored legal discourse, creates additional areas of underexplanation. 68 The exten-
sive reform of modern Hindu law during the 1950s, for example, was, in reality, 
partly designed to make it acceptable to all Indians. This hidden uniformizing 
agenda, later reinforced by the Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act of 1964 and par-
ticularly the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act of 1976, created further convergence 
with the formal provisions of the secular Special Marriage Act of 1954. This strategy 
of artii cial uniformization soon turned out to be hostile to women and children 
in practice, however. Merely assuming gender equality within a patriarchal setting 
actually advantaged men, creating new legal problems for women and other disem-
powered individuals. 69 Finally, as indicated earlier, the modernist ideology of legal 
uniformization collapsed as soon as the Hindu nationalist party rose to prominence 
in the 1990s and more people realized that insisting on a Uniform Civil Code might 
mean imposing Hindu law on all Indians. Since then, the Indian debates over the 
unii cation of family law have died down and scholars now openly refuse to discuss 
this issue. 70 
 The desired uniformization strategy was bound to fail for other reasons as well. 
One of these is directly relevant to the present analysis. Postmodern Indians some-
how began to remember fragments from their ancient legal past and realized the 
impossibility of total legal uniformity within Hindu law itself, let alone between the 
various personal laws and their partly religious identity markers. Recent recourse 
to old Hindu concepts suggests that legal reformers have at least partly overcome 
modernist myopia and have become more aware that modern statutory law could 
never completely replace the historically rooted, multi-tiered regulation mecha-
nisms. Ridding this region of ancient cultural practices and its rich range of cus-
toms by ignoring the socio-legal and religious aspects of such mechanisms would 
mean depriving India’s own people of their legal identity. Perhaps Indian lawmak-
ers have also wisely realized the unsustainability of promoting laws tending toward 
extreme individualism, especially for a massive “slumdog” population. Postmodern 
legal positivism in India therefore now often explicitly accounts for socioreligious 
norms and local values within legislative provisions and in case law, even from 
the highest courts. The policy of harmonization or convergence, as some scholars 
 68  See S. P. Sathe and Sathya Narayan, eds.,  Liberty, Equality and Justice: Struggles for a New Social 
Order (Lucknow: EBC Publishing (P) Ltd., 2003). 
 69  Derrett’s 1978 study,  Death of a Marriage Law , marks the beginning of the end of specialist scholars’ 
belief in following English legal developments through modernizing reforms in Indian family law. 
 70  E.g., Parashar and Dhanda,  Redei ning Family Law in India , ix. 
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prefer to call it, 71 of India’s personal laws is not a meek surrender to outdated con-
cepts of non-state authority. Rather, it is a deliberate, plurality-conscious and highly 
sophisticated postmodern construct; it is a new attempt to make sense of the never-
ending challenges of legal pluralism. This policy is virtually impossible to appre-
ciate through applying only a state-centric lens and a superi cial positivist analysis. 
It is increasingly evident that only pluralistic methodologies and techniques can 
open our eyes to what is really going on in Indian family law and can help the 
country i ne-tune a sustainable system of family law regulation that straddles state 
and non-state laws. 
 v.  postmodern indian and hindu marriage law 
 Although major Indian legal scholars seem bored with the perennial prominence of 
Hindu law, it constantly brings new surprises. The existing Hindu marriage law in 
India is a good example of a recycling of old substantive rules in the shape of mod-
ern statutory regulation. For example, at i rst sight modern Hindu law on marriage 
solemnization, codii ed and written in English, looks Westernized. However, the 
statutory law almost completely preserves the diversity-conscious, situation-specii c 
methods of traditional Hindu law. Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 pro-
vides for the solemnization of Hindu marriages:
 7. Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage. –
 (1) A Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary
rites and ceremonies of either party thereto.
 (2) Where such rites and ceremonies include the  saptapadi (that is, taking
of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred
i re), the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is
taken. 
 Subsection 1 coni rms unambiguously that the legal validity of a Hindu marriage 
in India is not determined primarily through state-controlled procedures such as for-
mal registration, but rather the relevant criterion remains performance of custom-
ary marriage rituals. The modern state has thus chosen to put the old shastric law 
into statutory form without even attempting to change the law’s substance or chal-
lenge its universal validity (provided that both parties to the marriage are Hindus). 
In cases of doubt, such as interreligious marriages solemnized according to Hindu 
rituals, Hindu litigants must simply prove that they followed the respective custom-
ary norms of marriage solemnization of either family. Although the statute seems to 
 71  See Narendra Subramanian, “Legal Change and Gender Inequality: Changes in Muslim Family Law 
in India,”  Law & Social Inquiry 33:3 (Summer 2008): 631–672. 
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presume that customs are i xed and certain, observation in practice shows that every 
marriage solemnization can be treated as a uniquely constructed sequence of rites 
and rituals whose totality is then simply perceived and treated as customary. This is 
legal pluralism “on the ground,” with enormous and often highly meaningful varia-
tions in ritual patterns from case to case. Nobody, it seems, knows enough about 
these practices today to make i nal judgments about details. 72 Helpfully, the role of 
custom as a source of Hindu marriage law has been explicitly respected in general 
terms by statutory Hindu matrimonial law, as the statute dei nes custom as a usage 
“followed for a long time.” 73 How this squares with the perception of every ritual as 
an ad hoc construct eludes precise analysis. The most relevant issue here, however, 
is that a legally valid custom under the newly codii ed Hindu law need no longer 
be a custom observed “since time immemorial” (as was required under the earlier 
strict and hostile Anglo-Hindu law), but merely “for a long time.” This leads to some 
instructive cases addressing how long is “long.” 
 Two lines of judicial decisions address this question. The i rst rel ects a type of 
patriarchal interference with basic gender justice through positivism, and it con-
dones deliberate misuse of state law, in most cases to let polygamous husbands “off 
the hook.”  Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra , in my view a mis-
guided precedent, is still misused more than forty years later. 74 In that case, a Hindu 
husband successfully claimed that he was not validly married to his wife. The whole 
ceremony was held to be legally invalid merely because some element of the ritu-
als was allegedly not “customary.” Few people realize that this case was about the 
emergence of new Buddhist customs, and many authors and cases blindly rely on 
this gender-insensitive decision. 
 The second line of cases better accounts for customary plurality and displays sen-
sitivity to sociocultural factors, gender justice, and situation specii city. In  Sumitra 
Devi v. Bhikhan Choudhary , a polygamous Hindu husband tried to claim that he 
was not validly married. 75 The court held for the wife by applying a presumption of 
 72  On the problems of determining prohibited degrees of marriage among Hindus and the issue of cus-
tom, see Patricia Uberoi, “Saving Custom or Promoting Incest? Post-Independence Marriage Law and 
Dravidian Marriage Practices,” in Parashar and Dhanda,  Redei ning Family Law in India , 54–85. 
 73  This, too, recycles tradition. Section 3 of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 provides:
 3. Dei nitions
 In this Act unless the context otherwise requires, 
(a)  the expressions “custom” and “usage” signify any rule which, having been continuously
and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtained the force of law among Hindus in
any local area, tribe, community, group or family: Provided that the rule is certain and not 
unreasonable or opposed to public policy; and provided further that in the case of a rule
applicable only to a family it has not been discontinued by the family…
 74  AIR 1965 SC 1564. 
 75  AIR 1985 SC 765. 
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Hindu marriage, in part because there had been a Hindu marriage ritual and there 
was also a child. Where local practice can be proved to exist over a few decades, 
especially among a large number of people, those new rituals are entitled to ofi cial 
legal recognition per this line of cases. 76 
 Feminist, modernist observers argue that people should register their marriages, 
and then women would simply not have such problems. However, this state-centric 
remedy does not work in the “slumdog” conditions of India (a fact recognized by the 
statutory law). 77 The key issue thus is not whether judicial interpretations will privi-
lege state law over social norms or religion, but whether there will be a fair hearing 
for both parties. More specii cally, the question is whether judges will be gender-
sensitive enough to resist the temptation to privilege men and their perspectives 
by relying exclusively on positive law. In a patriarchal setting, with very few senior 
women judges, there is no assurance that gender justice will be achieved. However, 
to abolish the existing law as a result of such problems seems an inadequate and 
rather excessive form of state intervention. 
 The potential conl ict, moreover, is not actually between “law” and “religion,” 
because the modern Hindu law on marriage solemnization measures the legal valid-
ity of a Hindu marriage by recourse to traditional sociocultural norms rather than 
“religion” as a superior entity. I highlight this to emphasize that a multi-tiered sys-
tem of family law regulation does not necessarily pit formal state law against reli-
gious authority. In the Indian case, formal state law is normally primarily opposed 
to countervailing social norms, not to religion as such. So the critical criterion for 
achieving better gender justice is how l exibly decision makers interpret socio-legal 
facts, and not whether they give in to religious authority. 
 This argument can be further strengthened. A more apparently religious element 
does exist and has caused some havoc, but only because gender-insensitive, tradition-
focused judges have allowed it to dominate. Subsection 7(2) of the Hindu Marriage 
Act, cited previously, states that “[w]here such rites and ceremonies include the 
 saptapadi … the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step 
is taken.” The statute itself thus indicates that this ritual may not always be per-
formed. The ritual of  saptapadī – the taking of seven steps by bride and bridegroom 
together, which in its pristine ancient form is a wonderfully dramatized friendship 
 76  See the neo-Buddhist case of  Baby v. Jayant , AIR 1981 Bombay 283, which is instructive even though 
only a High Court case. 
 77  Section 8(5) of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 provides that “[n]otwithstanding anything contained 
in this section, the validity of any Hindu marriage shall in no way be affected by the omission to make 
the entry.” This means that the modern Indian state (like many states in Asia and Africa) accepts that 
the ultimate legal criterion of legal validity of a Hindu marriage remains a matter for society and 
depends on societal norms and facts rather than religious doctrine or bureaucratic criteria provided 
by state law, such as registration formalities. 
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ritual near the end of the ceremony as the spouses walk away from the i re – is not 
performed in most Hindu marriages. The assumption of the modern statutory word-
ing clearly rel ects that the Hindu ritual of  saptapadī may be executed in many 
different ways – or not at all, depending on custom. The rest of the section indicates 
that its completion on the seventh step shall be the precise point at which the ritual-
ized solemn contract of Hindu marriage becomes legally valid and binding. 78 This 
rule was copied directly from the ancient text of  Manusmriti 8.227, where it had the 
obvious function of determining the precise point at which a Hindu marriage was 
legally binding. 79 The sacramental Hindu contract of marriage, according to the 
 Manusmriti as well as Section 7(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, may thus be com-
pleted on the seventh step of this particular ritual, but the  saptapadī may be omitted 
entirely and the marriage will nonetheless still be treated as legally valid. However, 
some judges have failed to read the statute accurately and thus quite unfairly hand 
down adverse decisions to women. 
 Signii cantly, allegations by some Hindu husbands (or after their death by their 
male relatives) that a woman was not validly married mainly arise in disputes over 
property or maintenance or when husbands are faced with criminal prosecution for 
polygamy. In such cases, devious lawyers and tradition-i xated judges facilitate legal 
mischief of depriving women of property entitlements and status, regrettably even in 
the Supreme Court. 80 The battle over this issue continues in India today. 
 Plurality-conscious legal positivism, informed by culture-sensitive modern stat-
utory Hindu law, has the capacity to take account of specii c sociocultural factors 
to achieve situation-specii c justice. This is done in Indian law by increasingly lib-
eral use of powerful presumptions of marriage, as authoritatively stated in a leading 
handbook for practitioners:
 Where it is proved that a marriage was performed in fact, the court will presume 
that it is valid in law, and that the necessary ceremonies have been performed. … 
 78  Contrary to almost exclusive emphasis on the sacramental nature of Hindu marriage in almost every 
textbook, a Hindu marriage is both a solemn contract and a sacrament. 
 79  The verse suggests that the performance of certain rituals and use of  mantras are an indication that 
Hindu marriage rituals are being performed, but the decisive ritual element shall be the seventh step 
of the  saptapadī . One can envisage distressing situations where it might be crucial to know when 
precisely during the lengthy marriage rituals the parties were actually husband and wife: What if the 
groom died during the extended rituals? Was the bride to be treated as a widow, or could she undergo 
a further marriage to another man? 
 80  Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra , AIR 1965 SC 1564, asserted that every Hindu 
marriage must involve a  saptapadī and invocation of the i re to be legally recognized. Injustice was 
also done in  Surjit Kaur v. Garja Singh , AIR 1994 SC 135, where apparent male chauvinist con-
tempt for a remarried Sikh woman – specii cally, slandering her to grab her deceased husband’s 
property – did not strike the judges as a blatant abuse of the modern law. For excellent examples of 
judicial alertness, see  M. Govindaraju v. K. Munisami Gounder , AIR 1997 SC 10 and  P. Mariammal v. 
Padmanabhan , AIR 2001 Madras 350. 
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There is an extremely strong presumption in favour of the validity of a marriage 
and the legitimacy of its offspring, if from the time of the alleged marriage, the par-
ties are recognised by all persons concerned as man and wife and are so described 
in important documents and on important occasions. The like presumption 
applies to the question whether the formal requisites of a valid marriage ceremony 
were satisi ed. 81 
 This legal position reinforces another important observation about multi-tiered 
Hindu matrimonial litigation. Modern Hindu law, like the old system, relies ulti-
mately on judicial alertness – the skill of judges in dispute processing (described 
as “extracting the thorn” [ vyavahāra ]). The primary function of India’s modern 
judges continues to involve the removal of particular social hurts, including gender 
injustices, and not simply the slavish application of statutory law. Application of the 
 dharmic Grundnorm on a case-by-case, situation-specii c basis remains pertinent in 
Hindu law today. Reading modern Hindu family law through the pluri-focal lenses 
of the old law thus offers important lessons for global comparative lawyers and serves 
the ultimate aim of justice. Regrettably, most modernist observers cannot perceive 
Hindu law in this way because they too quickly presume that anything “Hindu” is 
necessarily (and unhelpfully) “religious.” 
 In India today, then, even in the absence of formal registration documents, a mar-
ried woman’s legal status is protected by law if she can show through other evidence 
that she was in fact married. Indian state law has carefully crafted mechanisms to 
account for such claims and clearly remains conscious of “living law.” Given the 
public nature of Hindu marriage rituals, there will likely always be some witness to 
a marriage ritual who could speak in support of an individual faced with denial of 
her marriage. Applying presumptions of marriage offers a socially meaningful and 
effective remedy. 82 Signii cantly, some recent Indian reports suggest that unmarried 
cohabitation should now be recognized as equivalent to marriage. This modernist 
turn seeks to rename unregistered marriage as “unmarried cohabitation.” However, 
that renaming effort, seeking to copy Western models and apparently anticipating 
eventual recognition of same-sex relationships in Indian law, does signii cant cul-
tural violence to many millions of Indians by treating traditional cultural patterns 
and legal practices with typical modernist contempt by failing to accord them the 
dei nition of marriage. 
 Modern Hindu and Indian law itself, however, quietly admits that there are limits 
to state-centric positivism, and it does not fuss about strictly preserving and following, 
let alone obeying, religious tradition. The question arises whether to interpret this 
 81  Satyajeet A. Desai, ed.,  Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law (New Delhi: Butterworths, 2004), 770–771. 
 82  Presumptions of marriage are now also applied in some cases among Asians in Britain. See  Chief 
Adjudication Ofi cer v. Kirpal Kaur Bath , [2000] 1 Family Law Reports 8 [CA]. 
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as giving in to  hindutva , that is, a blanket recognition of Hindu tradition as evidence 
of continued self-controlled ordering or instead more as a consequence of resource 
limitations in “slumdog territory.” Probably all these factors (and others) play some 
role. The continuing legal recognition of unregistered marriages in Indian law is 
not an oversight or a slippage, however; it is a systemic necessity. Although modern 
Indian state law could dream of developing comprehensive socio-legal control, reli-
able records of how several hundred millions of people marry in their homes will 
never be produced. 83 India’s post-colonial positivists employed the ancient model 
of customary self-regulated order as a useful ingredient for reconstructing modern 
Hindu law. The real challenge today is to navigate gender-sensitivity and justice 
across the boundaries of state law and non-state law when contested cases come up 
before courts. Another challenge, and probably a more difi cult one, is to persuade 
scholars that this multi-tiered system can be trusted to deliver justice to the people 
who need it most – women and children. 84 
 Legal scholars today tend to argue that if individuals have a legal problem, they 
should turn to state law for help. They should not access traditional sources and 
certainly should not use religious authorities. However, evidence from Britain’s 
eighty-i ve Sharia Councils and Muslim Arbitration Tribunals coni rms that such 
centralist claims overlook social reality and do not match with what is happening 
around the world. The Indian evidence clearly shows that most people do not turn 
straight to lawyers or courts; they i rst negotiate within their respective sociocultural 
spheres. Even if warring parties eventually turn to modern Hindu law mechanisms, 
the ofi cial law itself refers Hindus swiftly back to custom and lower-level processes 
for dispute settlement and ascertainment of what is appropriate. Superior Indian 
courts are far too busy, and seriously plagued by arrears, to become involved in 
airing “dirty laundry” in public, especially in divorce law. 85 The ancient Sanskrit 
term of  vyavahāra , inadequately and too narrowly translated for centuries as “court 
proceedings,” in fact comprises all these various forms of dispute settlement, both 
 83  Formal marriage registration remains an option for the elite and for those who require ofi cial docu-
mentation (e.g., to facilitate travel abroad). It is important to be aware that registered Hindu marriages 
are not automatically treated as legally valid in India. Indian law still requires proof that the requisite 
customary rituals were followed, a fact that causes much surprise in European embassies and court-
rooms. See  Joyita Saha v. Rajesh Kumar Pandey , AIR 2000 Calcutta 109, and the interesting case 
studies of Perveez Mody, “Love and the Law: Love-Marriage in Delhi,”  Modern Asian Studies 36:1 
(February 2002): 223–256. 
 84  See McClain, “Marriage Pluralism in the United States” (in this volume) and Wilson, “The Perils of 
Privatized Marriage” (in this volume). 
 85  Disgust over such warmongering is elaborately expressed in  V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat , AIR 1994 SC 710. 
This decision modii ed the Indian judicial approach to irretrievable breakdown of Hindu marriages 
as a ground for divorce, allowing it in exceptional circumstances, but without opening the l oodgates 
because the case is not taken as a precedent. Signii cantly, the husband was a senior lawyer. 
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formal and informal, and is in itself a multi-tiered entity. 86 It is striking that such 
realizations are only evident to us now, in the postmodern age of reinventing the 
wheels of Indian justice. 
 vi.  post-divorce maintenance laws, the indian 
constitution, and hindu legal concepts
 Although postmodern Indian state law happily allows self-ordering in matrimonial 
matters, it has purposefully intervened to protect basic social welfare frameworks 
that continue to rely on traditional family structures for delivery. Rather mislead-
ingly, this has been portrayed in most writing as a battle between state law and 
religion, and specii cally between the secular Indian state and Islamic authorities 
(as epitomized in the world-famous  Shah Bano affair and its aftermath). But this 
complex saga, too, is actually a contest between state-centric legal regulation and 
sociocultural delegation of important aspects of India’s matrimonial law rather than 
simply a battle over “law” and “religion.” Middle-class analysts conveniently forget 
that the Indian state actually seeks to avoid recourse to its formal support mecha-
nisms as a critically important aspect of its “slumdog law” strategy, particularly when 
that would implicate state i nancial resources. 87 It is thus important to review how 
informal support mechanisms in Indian matrimonial law have evolved in the recent 
past and how they continue to contribute a vital element to India’s multi-tiered mar-
riage regulation by working to subjugate so-called religious dogma to the sophisti-
cated social welfare agenda of the Indian state. 
 India’s radically activist post-divorce maintenance law apparently seeks to protect 
“pre-existing rights” of divorced or widowed women. 88 As in earlier traditional patri-
archal contexts, married women are entitled to receive support from their husbands 
during marriage, and they remain entitled to maintenance after the marriage ends, 
whether by death or otherwise. As indicated earlier, this neatly matches the redef-
inition of “wife” under Indian law after 1973, which explicitly includes “divorced 
wife” and presumes the inclusion of widows. 89 In brief: Postmodern Indian state law 
is clearly not afraid to confront, tackle, and co-opt other forms of law, including reli-
gious law, to construct a revised, gender-sensitive legal framework that protects and 
 86  See Werner Menski, “On Vyavahāra,”  Indologica Taurinensia 33 (Turin: CESMEO, 2007), 123–147 
(proceedings of the “Law and Society” Section of the 13th World Sanskrit Conference in Edinburgh, 
July 10th–14th, 2006). 
 87  See Menski,  Modern Indian Family Law . 
 88  This concept is found hidden in i erce litigation during the 1970s over the succession rights of Hindu 
widows under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956. See  V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi , 
AIR 1977 SC 1944, and  Bai Vajia v. Thakobhai Chelabhai , AIR 1979 SC 993. 
 89  Code of Criminal Procedure § 125 (1973). 
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helps impoverished individuals, especially women, to “keep body and soul together” 
(as a famous judicial phrase goes). 90 
 This remains an under-analyzed phenomenon in legal circles, even though I 
have written about it in some detail. 91 Signii cant Indian legal developments can be 
closely linked to 9/11, and Indian legal developments today are signii cantly inl u-
enced by the presence of a large Muslim minority that seeks to assert “religion” as 
an alternative legal authority. My analysis of politically sensitive issues along these 
lines has resulted in blacklisting by several Indian legal publishers, for it seemingly 
upsets the presuppositions of many scholars and lawyers about gender and law, law 
and religion, and especially about the political football of legal uniformity in India. 
I have nonetheless continued such writing and analysis because it comports with 
what actually goes on in Indian law today, even if it is not politically popular because 
it addresses the reality of “slumdog law.” 
 As a legal realist who conducts his own i eldwork, I observe that the Indian state 
today does not shy away from employing sociocultural and religious concepts to nav-
igate and redei ne, where necessary, the boundaries of state law and non-state law. 
Because such skillful navigation takes place on several levels at the same time, and 
because much other literature wrongly claims that the Indian state has surrendered 
power to religious dogma, a few extra words are needed here. 
 In essence, the Indian state employs two methods (often conceptually contradic-
tory) to improve the i nancial position of potentially vulnerable individuals. First, 
since colonial times there have been efforts to strengthen the legal rights of women 
regarding property entitlements. These have given rise to some notable but piece-
meal reforms. The Hindu Succession Act of 1956 went much beyond the earlier 
Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act of 1937 and its provision of a “limited estate” 
to Hindu widows. It secured, on paper at least, greater rights for Hindu women as 
 90  Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia , AIR 1979 SC 362 (Mr. Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer (as he then 
was).  Bai Tahira was an important case before the more famous  Shah Bano case,  Mohd. Ahmed Khan 
v. Shah Bano Begum , AIR 1985 SC 945.
 91  See Werner Menski, “Asking for the Moon: Legal Uniformity in India from a Kerala Perspective,” 
 Kerala Law Times 2006(2), Journal Section: 52–78; Werner Menski, “Double Benei ts and Muslim 
Women’s Postnuptial Rights,”  Kerala Law Times 2007(2), Journal Section: 21–34; Werner Menski, 
“Literate Kerala, Bribes and a New Case of  Mata : On the Limits of Judicial Patience and Legal 
Realism,”  Kerala Law Times 2008(4), Journal Section: 21–31; Werner Menski, “The Uniform Civil 
Code Debate in Indian Law: New Developments and Changing Agenda,”  German Law Journal 
9:3 (March 2008), available at  http://www.germanlawjournal.com ; Werner Menski, “Indian Secular 
Pluralism and its Relevance for Europe,” in  Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity , eds. Ralph Grillo 
et al. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), 31–48; Werner Menski, “Law, State and Culture: How Countries 
Accommodate Religious, Cultural and Ethnic Diversity: The British and Indian Experiences,” in 
 Cultural Diversity and the Law: State Responses From Around the World , eds. Marie-Claire Foblets, 
Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, and Alison Dundes Renteln (Brussels: Bruylant, 2010), 
403–446. 
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absolute owners of property that earlier used to be joint family property. Section 14 
of the 1956 act immediately made such Hindu widows the absolute owners of any 
share they previously held as a “limited estate,” leading to thousands of cases i led 
by enraged males, including many Sikhs. 92 The transition from joint family owner-
ship to individual property rights was, however, never fully completed. Postmodern 
Indian law has gradually begun to rediscover the role and value of the family, partic-
ularly the joint family, as a most basic element of social welfare. 
 At the same time, Indian law has tenaciously pursued modernist tendencies and 
seeks to strengthen women’s property rights at the individual level. Most evidently 
for Hindus, this was i nally achieved by amending the Hindu Succession Act in 
2005 to grant equal birthrights in joint family property to Hindu sons and daughters 
throughout India. Such reform had gradually been implemented earlier in several 
southern states, which often – although not always – tend to be a little more enlight-
ened when it comes to gender sensitivity. Concurrently, however, and to the cha-
grin of modernists and feminists, Indian law has also continued to make vulnerable 
individuals dependent on various welfare duties toward them delivered by those 
(mostly male) individuals who hold the purse strings and control property rights. 
This means not only that all parents have to pay for their children’s upbringing and 
welfare, but also that children have a legal duty to maintain their parents, when 
necessary, in accordance with the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior 
Citizens Act of 2007. 
 Further, in a move that upset some feminists, either Hindu husbands or wives 
may ofi cially have to pay maintenance to their indigent spouse under Sections 24 
and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955. Whereas a Hindu husband who seeks to 
live off his wife in this way is publicly ridiculed in several reported cases, women 
who go to court claiming maintenance can today increasingly count on the state’s 
support for such gendered claims. The results have been truly amazing. Recent 
legal changes are now beginning to create new gender imbalances. A highly signii -
cant movement in the navigation of India’s multi-tiered maintenance laws occurred 
two weeks after 9/11 when the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act of 
2001 (Act No. 50 of 2001) removed the maximum allowable monthly maintenance 
payment (500 Rupees) that had been in place under Section 125 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code of 1973. The new law now permits all Indian wives (and ex-wives, 
by dei nition) to claim appropriate post-divorce maintenance. The principle is by 
now i rmly entrenched in case law. 
 However, some recent cases suggest risks of new transgressions of gender balance 
when women attempt to misuse such rightly protective provisions. 93 The relative 
 92  See  Partap Singh v. Union of India , AIR 1985 SC 1695. 
 93  See Menski, “Double Benei ts and Muslim Women’s Postnuptial Rights” and Menski, “Literate 
Kerala, Bribes and a New Case of  Mata .” Both articles concern cases in which divorced Muslim 
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scholarly silence about such emerging imbalances evinces either ignorance of case 
law developments at the High Court level (a familiar problem for Indian legal schol-
arship) or disgust that many Indian women ask for handouts from men rather than 
making claims in their own right. Either way, gender relations and marital expecta-
tions rather than matters of religious authority still occupy the center stage of Indian 
marriage dramas. 
 Silence about such signii cant recent legal developments also hides the fact that 
under current Indian law women can abuse the system in the precise manner that a 
leading Muslim scholar, Tahir Mahmood, warned of in 1986. 94 The strategy is sim-
ple. Marry a prosperous man, then divorce him or bring about a divorce (it does not 
really matter how), and then proceed to demand the considerable legal entitlements 
to post-divorce maintenance that Indian state law quietly introduced two weeks after 
9/11. Such developments illustrate the concurrent contradictory moves of strengthen-
ing individual property rights for women, particularly through succession laws, on 
the one hand and reconnecting women to male authority through maintenance 
arrangements on the other. It is possible that this bifurcated, multi-tiered approach 
is actually designed to cater to elite women through one strategy while providing 
for India’s millions of “slumdog women” through the other route. Nobody talks 
about this; legal developments just seem to happen. Here again, sophisticated ofi -
cial policies disclose lawmakers’ plurality consciousness and acute awareness about 
an enormously different range of expectations among Indians when it comes to 
social welfare mechanisms. 
 Ultimately, the underlying agenda can be linked to protection of the constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution as well as 
several other constitutional provisions. India’s method of implementing such guar-
antees is to hold social actors accountable and restrain religious authority, where 
necessary, to ensure the survival of vulnerable individuals. This is, in my analysis, a 
solution based primarily on the ancient Indian concept of limited state regulation of 
the private sphere. The development of India’s radical post-divorce maintenance law 
thus coni rms that Hindu law has remained a much more important ingredient of 
Indian constitutional law than modernist writers would wish to know. The realities 
of such “soft legal positivism” in Indian family law inl uence the entire legal system 
as a whole and thus offer a blueprint for more sophisticated and culture-specii c 
legal development in this internally pluralistic jurisdiction. 
 The focus of scholarly agitation, however, has distractingly been on Muslim law. 
Such agitation depicts a gender war between the supposedly secular post-colonial 
women were able to rely on pro-women approaches. Another way to phrase this analysis, however, is 
that men have been unsuccessful in their attempts to avoid responsibilities. 
 94  Tahir Mahmood,  Personal Laws in Crisis (New Delhi: Metropolitan, 1986), 127–130. 
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Indian state and the medieval-rooted Muslim authorities who seek to deny Muslim 
wives basic entitlements from an ex-husband after divorce. Verse 2.241 of the Quran 
itself, typically vague, merely suggests that a divorcing husband should be kind to 
the woman he divorces. Early Islamic scholar-jurists interpreted this verse to impose 
responsibility on the husband for maintenance of an ex-wife until it was clear that 
any child she might bear was the child of the ex-husband. Then she could, and 
should, move on. This means that a Muslim woman who has just given birth cannot 
even rely on the traditional  iddat rule for one day; 95 she is instantly without support, 
even though the father has an obligation to maintain the child. There is strong evi-
dence that Muslim men everywhere manipulate such rules to their advantage, and 
it is clear that Muslim jurists agreed over time to limit the  iddat payments to roughly 
three months. This is also unjust. 
 Under Indian law, however, a guiding principle has been established since 1979 
that maintenance arrangements must be sufi cient to “keep the woman’s body and 
soul together.” 96 In the infamous  Shah Bano case of 1985, this development was 
dramatically challenged by a senior Muslim lawyer through reliance on Islamic 
religious authority. 97 Terminating his marriage to Shah Bano after some forty years, 
he had offered her some small amounts of payment that technically complied with 
Muslim law but violated the emerging principles of Indian general law. On appeal 
before the Supreme Court, Shah Bano won a crucial victory and secured main-
tenance for life. Five Hindu judges interpreted the relevant Quranic verses and 
held that there was no conl ict between the Quran and India’s secular Criminal 
Procedure Code of 1973 (which overrode the religious personal law in any event). 
Because the Indian Supreme Court further needled Muslims by suggesting that 
India should introduce a Uniform Civil Code, widespread public unrest followed 
almost instantly. 
 The rest is much-misunderstood recent legal history. The Indian government 
quickly promulgated an act that seemed to take away the right of divorced Muslim 
wives to post-divorce maintenance beyond the three-month  iddat period. 98 However, 
despite the assertions of irate scholars and many others, the Indian government did 
not let Muslim women down. It cleverly hid within the 1986 act a wording that 
became, in due course, a silver bullet for all Indian ex-wives. Section 3(1)(a) states 
that a divorced Muslim wife shall be entitled to “a reasonable and fair provision and 
 95  The  iddat period is basically a woman’s menstrual cycle of three months, or about ninety days. 
 96  Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia , AIR 1979 SC 362. 
 97  Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum , AIR 1985 SC 945. See also Bix, “Pluralism and 
Decentralization” (in this volume) and Nichols, “Reconsidering the Boundaries” (in this volume). 
 98  The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act (1986) actually does what its name sug-
gests, however: It protects the rights of divorced Muslim wives. This was authoritatively coni rmed by 
the Indian Supreme Court in  Danial Latii  v. Union of India , 2001 (7) SCC 740. 
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maintenance to be made and paid to her within the  iddat period by her former hus-
band.” Since 1988, this provision has been authoritatively interpreted to mean that 
divorced Muslim wives are entitled to two types of support: maintenance during the 
 iddat period and reasonable provision for her life after that. Both types of support 
must be made during the  iddat period, so that a wife who i nds herself virtually on 
the pavement in “slumdog land” has instant access to the courts. The Supreme 
Court, in  Danial Latii  , calmly coni rmed that position, albeit after i fteen years of 
studied silence – and no riots ensued at that particularly well-chosen moment, two 
weeks after 9/11. 
 Worldwide scholarship, however, continues to misguidedly assert that Indian law 
gave in to religious fundamentalism from 1986 onward. Nothing could be further 
from the truth. India’s multi-tiered post-marriage law has clearly subjugated alleg-
edly religious doctrine, and it works assiduously for better gender justice by remem-
bering and actively co-opting religious and social normative orders. Navigation of 
the boundaries of general laws and personal laws has been a remarkable success. 
Now the challenge is to protect such achievements and to avoid turning gendered 
rebalancing into gender war. 
 vii.  conclusion 
 The conceptually mature nature of postmodern Indian family law as a harmonized 
personal law system is beginning to become more apparent today. There is solid evi-
dence that the Indian state has managed to regulate the majoritarian Hindu family 
law in a uniquely hybrid manner, navigating the boundaries of past and present, 
tradition and modernity, state law and non-state laws. Additionally, by overriding tra-
ditional and “religious” dogma when necessary, postmodern Indian family law has 
created an increasingly strong social welfare net through combining old principles 
of socioeconomic responsibility with newly worded and socialism-inspired constitu-
tional principles. 99 Indian state law’s strategically wise and i nancially prudent reli-
ance on traditional self-control mechanisms within society illustrates the extent of 
navigation between the multiple tiers of general law and personal laws. It also makes 
sophisticated use of internal tiers of pluralism within the various personal laws. 
 This analysis coni rms that today’s modern-looking Indian family law system 
is not just “modern,” but consciously postmodern. It is dei nitely no longer built 
on a primary assumption that total legal control of society can be exercised by 
state-made laws. New methods of “soft legal centralism” or “soft positivism” illus-
trate that India’s state law has again learned to delegate much legal authority to 
society, but not – I must reiterate here – to religious authority. Linking concepts 
 99  See Menski,  Modern Indian Family Law . 
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like  hindutva (Hinduness) with theocracy is merely ideological scaremongering. 
Crucially, the “soft positivism” of Indian law today is able to trust the social sphere, 
while co-opting it ever more closely. After all, both have been sharing the same 
social space and awareness of ancient legal tradition and are deeply sensitized to 
each other’s presence. The mutually benei cial collaboration between old and 
new in Indian matrimonial laws is clearly a plurality-conscious reconstruction, 
a multi-tiered arrangement that works with increasing efi ciency for more than a 
billion people. It is protected by an umbrella of powerful constitutional guaran-
tees, some of which have acquired increasingly direct relevance. The inevitable 
result of this strategic alliance is that state law thereby delegates a considerable 
amount of legal authority to the social sphere and to non-state laws. This is, at 
least for me, not only a good and sustainable form of managing positive law, but 
it also evidences the living reality of legal pluralism as a superior technique in 
today’s multi-tiered world for handling the immense, never-ending challenges in 
the search for justice. 
 My pluralistic analysis also supports the argument that the so-called religious per-
sonal laws of Asian and African countries today are themselves multilevel mecha-
nisms of governance that are crucial to the maintenance of appropriate standards. 
They are largely secular, not just “religious,” and they not only show remarkable 
resilience but are also essential for good governance and maintenance of the nation’s 
identity. These “traditional” laws and their sociocultural norms are now clawing back 
territory that seemed lost earlier. Meanwhile, to many skeptical observers, they seem 
to have ini ltrated, undermined, and subverted modern state laws in Asia and Africa, 
causing consternation and surprise among modernists and positivists. However, 
these “traditional” forces are not coming back to rule absolutely; they never did so 
in the i rst place. Rather, they are actually making their customary contributions as 
support mechanisms for governance within postmodern systems that we can observe 
and study as intrinsically multi-tiered and internally pluralistic. 
 In India, state-centric positivism of the colonial and early post-colonial type has 
clearly lost credibility and stands on increasingly questionable moral authority. 
Similarly, insistence on simple universal “rule of law” arguments or on globally 
uniform standards of human rights sounds increasingly absurd for a legal system 
that fails to provide direct welfare remedies for hundreds of millions of people liv-
ing below the poverty line. Speaking and writing about “slumdog law” seems to 
irritate some of my colleagues as well as Indian lawyers, but how does one protect 
the rights of those people who have no means to assert them? India knows many 
ancient answers to such burning questions and has been experimenting with vari-
ous methods. When a leading Indian scholar argues that human rights are not gifts 
of the West and highlights instead that the local, and not the global, “remains the 
crucial site for the enunciation, implementation, enjoyment, and exercise of human 
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rights,” 100 we should realize that India still needs a sensible state – but it has to be a 
soft and yet strong central state, prepared to listen to other voices than its own. 
 This retraditionalization of post-colonial Indian laws and their transformation into 
postmodern laws is partly built on vague memories and sketchy knowledge of ancient 
legal concepts. It has gone hand in hand, however, with a conscious and gradually 
more vocal rejection of state-centric Western models and legal rules. This devel-
opment was foretold in the 1970s when Derrett observed that prominent Supreme 
Court judges like V. R. Krishna Iyer were turning their backs on the “Anglophilic 
bias in Bharat’s justice, equity and good conscience,” arguing that “free India has to 
i nd its conscience in our rugged realities and no more in alien legal thought.” 101 
 Indira Gandhi must have thought about  dharma rather than positive law when she 
engineered the Indian Emergency during the 1970s, partly to remind Indians that 
legal developments were not going in the right direction. Of course her self-serving 
actions overshadow much of the analysis. However, her most famous electoral slogan, 
 garībī hatāo (banish poverty), anticipates concern for “slumdog law.” It contains a 
manifesto of development that cannot be implemented unless the ancient concepts 
of inevitable interconnectedness and responsibility for “the other” are remembered 
and practiced. This restructuring, based on ancient Hindu concepts of  rājadharma , 
includes the ruler’s duty to maintain a sustainable balance in a deeply heterogeneous 
society. Recent Indian phenomena like public interest litigation show that recycling 
ancient concepts can promote badly needed forms of justice today. 
 Using such borrowings from the legal past, it has become possible for secular 
Indian constitutional law to develop a new culture-specii c style of plurality-focused 
legal positivism that remains closely related to Hindu principles and elements of 
other personal laws, including Muslim law. Rather than constituting evidence of 
the state giving in to religious claims, as some modernists suggest, this sophisticated 
strategy of reconnection makes society and religion work for the overarching agenda 
of the state. Relying on ancient holistic concepts of duty, it seems that Indian pub-
lic and private law can actually make somewhat larger claims on individual citi-
zens than can Western-style laws. Politician-lawmakers of modern India, as well as 
many judges, are now appealing more openly to such duty consciousness, asking for 
greater moral integrity and even  dharma sensitivity. 
 My observations suggest that Indian law has been moving toward further indigeni-
zation in two other major ways. First, through increased awareness of the continued 
relevance of traditional sociocultural concepts, Indian state law is acutely sensitive 
to legal pluralism and its manipulative and dynamizing potential. Second, there 
 100  Upendra Baxi,  The Future of Human Rights (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), vi and 89. 
 101  J. Duncan M. Derrett,  Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law: Anglo-Hindu Legal Problems , 
vol. 3 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), xxi. 
Werner Menski252
is stronger realization that the application of foreign-style laws and Western legal 
concepts like individualism and privileged treatment of contract law and private 
property do not suit Indian socioeconomic and legal “slumdog” conditions; instead, 
readjustment by strengthening duty-based normative systems is necessary. 
 It is prudent (and realistic) to be constantly alert to the never-ending expecta-
tions of justice to face the existing enormous challenges. The lessons learned by 
post- colonial India in this respect point to serious dissatisfaction with positivistic 
modernity. There is nothing religious or fundamentalist about this, as the search for 
appropriateness and justice within the composite pluralistic structure of Indian legal 
systems is not a doctrinal matter of religious belief or social dictate. It is instead an 
endeavor to establish a somewhat idealistic approach in which religion and ethics, 
society and state (and really all aspects of life) are intimately interconnected. 
 Indian legal realism, today no longer in its embryonic stage, has managed to cul-
tivate the customary plurality of traditional Hindu family law. It has not abandoned 
reformist agendas and human rights ideals by listening to such tradition. But neither is 
it blinded by intellectual dogmatisms. Rather, Indian law is desperately searching for 
sustainable practical justice and appropriateness, not for an ideal Hindu ideology as 
opponents of the personal law system constantly insinuate. Taking a holistic, plurality-
conscious approach to the development of Indian personal laws, one can therefore see 
that the postmodern Indian state values substantive reforms more than ideology and 
rhetorical uniformity, especially when i nancial implications are involved. 
 This exceptionally sophisticated legal rearrangement, outwardly engineered by 
swift positivist lawmaking but inspired by deeply considered socio-legal and ethi-
cal concerns, may eventually be understood as a key example of postmodern legal 
reconstruction. It demonstrates a spirit of plurality consciousness, helps us to under-
stand plurality of law as a global phenomenon, and suggests that all legal systems are 
culture-specii c constructs that need to match their respective populations. Because 
the population of the United States, as an immigrant country, is composed of so 
many different elements and entities, it is hardly surprising that multi-tiered meth-
ods of regulating family law have been developing over time. 102 It is thus necessary, 
it seems to me, to acknowledge that exclusive state control of the wide domain of 
family law is not a realistic possibility in our postmodern times. That message, an 
ancient and almost forgotten truth, is evidently being remembered and now applied 
in Indian family law. It is a globally valid message that countries need to translate 
into suitable legal arrangements to i t the culture-specii c needs of their respective 
populations. Trying to exile religion from this pluralistic scenario appears to be, in 
light of the Indian experience, an entirely futile endeavor. 
 102  See Estin, “Unofi cial Family Law” (in this volume) and Nichols, “Reconsidering the Boundaries” (in 
this volume). 
